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BACK TO BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REVISITED 
IN EDUCATIONAL DIVERSITY 
Dawn R. Swink* 
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by 
chains and liberate him, bring him to the starting line of a race 
and then say, 'You are free to compete with all others' and still 
justly believe you have been completely fair. 1 
In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of 
race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons 
equally, we must treat them differently. 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Affirmative action in higher education has never been more 
established, and more vulnerable, than it is today. It is 
difficult to find a reputable school that does not practice some 
form of affirmative action, yet affirmative action is under the 
most serious attack it has endured in decades. Recent 
constitutional challenges have yielded conflicting results in 
Texas, Washington, Georgia, Maryland, and Michigan. The 
fundamental issue in these cases and in this article is whether 
educational diversity is a compelling interest that justifies 
racial preferences in university admission programs. 
Affirmative action programs do serve compelling interests. 
Our universities are, and should continue to be, places where 
people from different walks of life and diverse backgrounds 
come together to learn from one another. Learning with such 
people helps destroy racial stereotypes and animosity. This 
* Assistant Professor of Business Law at the University of Saint Thomas in St. Paul, 
Minnesota. I would like to thank Vincent, Zachary and Chantel Wang for their never-
ending faith, love, and patience. A special thank you to Mr. Chad Balfanz for his 
incredible proof-reading skills. 
1. Nicolaus Mills, Introduction, in Debating Affirmative Action 1, 7 (Nicolaus 
Mills, ed., Delta 1994) (writing about President Lyndon Johnson's commencement 
speech at Howard University in June 1965). 
2. Regents of U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (opinion ofBlackmun, 
J.). 
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article argues that diversity should continue to be used as a 
factor in the admissions process. 
University education typically occurs early in life and is of 
limited duration. Applying affirmative action programs only 
during this period creates an interesting paradox. Any 
detrimental effects from the programs will be short-lived. 
However, because affirmative action is applied to the formative 
years, the benefits last a lifetime. In other words, education can 
be the "ramp up" to a level playing field, eliminating the need 
for affirmative action later in life or in other fields of endeavor. 
Race should be used as a factor in admissions. 
This article traces the formative history of affirmative 
action, including the Bakke decision. It outlines recent Court 
decisions in Texas, Washington, Georgia, Maryland, and 
Michigan and examines the status of "color-blind" programs in 
California as potential indicators of what happens when race 
as a factor is removed from the admissions selection process. 
Finally, the importance of racial diversity in higher education 
is analyzed. 
II. THE COLORFUL HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
The U.S. Constitution is not a color-blind document. In 
fact, it is race-biased. In its original form, each member of the 
House of Representatives was required to have been a "Citizen" 
for seven years, 3 and each member of the Senate was required 
to have been a "Citizen" for nine years. 4 Moreover, the 
Framers of the Constitution also required the President to be a 
natural born citizen or a citizen at the time of the adoption of 
the Constitution.5 These seemingly innocuous requirements 
failed to include any persons other than whites; African 
Americans were effectively excluded from citizenship.6 In Dred 
Scott, the Supreme Court's analysis of the framers' original 
intent reveals that a "perpetual and impassable barrier was 
intended to be erected between the white race and the one they 
3. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
4. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. 
5. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
6. The original intent of the framers was not to include Mrican-Americans as 
citizens, as the founding fathers believed that Mrican-Americans were of an 'inferior 
order" for whom slavery was a "benefit." See Dred Scott u. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 403 
(1856). 
211] BACK TO BAKKE 213 
had reduced to slavery."7 
To maintain this color-conscious barrier from 1790 to 1870, 
the U.S. Congress limited naturalization and voting rights to 
whites. From 1879 to 1906,8 the color barrier fell slightly when 
the U.S. Supreme Court expanded naturalization to include 
whites and freed slaves.9 The number of representatives 
allotted to each state was determined by the number of "free 
Persons," "excluding Indians not taxed" and "three-fifths of all 
other persons."10 
Despite its misguided beginnings, it was the Fourteenth 
Amendment where notions of affirmative action originated. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that "No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the 
equal protection of the laws."11 The underlying policy was that 
state governments must treat similarly situated persons in a 
similar manner. 12 When the U.S. Supreme Court had its first 
opportunity to interpret "Equal Protection" in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Justice Black, dissenting, noted that the 
Amendment "came into being primarily to protect Negroes 
from discrimination, and while some of its language can and 
does protect others, all know that the chief purpose behind it 
was to protect ex-slaves."13 It was this ambiguity in defining 
"Equal Protection" that led to the seminal decision, Plessy v. 
Ferguson/4 and the doctrine of"separate but equal."15 
7. Id. at 409. 
8. See Ozawa v. U.S., 260 U.S. 178, 192-93 (1922). In Ozawa, the debate was 
whether the explicit exclusions of citizens for blacks and Indians meant that only the 
enumerated races were excluded or, rather, that the Framers intended inclusion of 
whites only. 
9. See id. 
10. U.S. Const. art. I,§ 2, cl. 3. 
11. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
12. This policy reflects the Yick Wo principle which originated in Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885) (holding that a facially neutral statute requiring permits 
for laundry operators violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment when all Chinese applicants were denied permits). 
13. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 275 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). See also 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879) (holding the Fourteenth 
Amendment was "one of a series of constitutional provisions having a common purpose, 
namely securing to a race, recently emancipated, a race that through many generations 
had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy."). But see City 
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 559 (where Justice Marshall stated that in 
fact, Congress's concern in passing these Amendments was that states would not 
adequately respond to racial violence or discrimination against newly freed slaves). 
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana law 
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The modern era of "affirmative action" began in 1961 when 
President John F. Kennedy first coined the term in Executive 
Order 10,925.16 That Order forbade federal "government 
contractors from discriminating on the basis of 'race, creed, 
color, or national origin."'17 It required contractors "to take 
affirmative action" to prevent discrimination to applicants and 
employees. 18 
In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act. 19 This 
ground breaking legislation prohibited "race ... [and ethnicity] 
discrimination by private employers, agencies, and educational 
institutions receiving federal funds."20 The scope of affirmative 
action was again expanded when President Lyndon B. Johnson 
issued Executive Order 11,246 in 1965. That Order provided 
"equal opportunity in Federal employment for all qualified 
persons ... [and] prohibit[ed] discrimination in employment 
because of race, creed, color, or national origin.'m Congress 
soon after created the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission22 as a vehicle for reviewing federal affirmative 
action policies. By the 1970's, federal agencies began enforcing 
regulations, calling for timetables and goals to implement this 
idea of affirmative action. 
Forty years have passed since President Kennedy issued 
Executive Order 10,925. While the initial efforts of affirmative 
action were directed primarily at federal government 
that required segregation of black and white train passengers. When Plessy, seven-
eighths white, attempted to sit in the passenger car reserved for whites, and refused to 
move to the car "used for the race to which he belonged," he was ejected from the train 
and arrested. 
15. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 401 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) ("From Plessy to Brown v. Board of Education, ours was a Nation where, by law, 
an individual could be given 'special' treatment based on the color of his skin."). 
16. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1961). Executive Order 10,925 was 
superseded by Executive Order 11,246. 
17. Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
33, 33 (1992). 
18. Executive Order 10,925. 
19. 42 u.s.c. § 2000 (1999). 
20. 42 U.S. C. §2000d of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: "No person in the 
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation 'in,' be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Emphasis added. 
21. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65) as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e (1999). Emphasis Added. 
22. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 
(1972). 
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employment and private industry, affirmative action gradually 
extended into other areas, including admissions programs in 
higher education. As the application of affirmative action 
expanded, so did the group of intended beneficiaries.23 
Today, the originally intended goals of promoting equality 
and eliminating race-based discrimination are confronted by 
"an increasing number of Americans ... declaring war on 
policies giving 'preferential' treatment to specified racial and 
ethnic groups."24 Whether out of hostility, lack of knowledge, or 
simple indifference, a recent survey concludes that forty 
percent to sixty percent of all white Americans incorrectly 
believe that the average black American is faring about as well 
as, and perhaps even better than, the average white American 
in terms of their jobs, incomes, schooling and health care.25 
Government statistics show that, while they have narrowed the 
gap, African Americans continue to lag significantly behind 
whites in the aforementioned areas. 26 Such misperceptions may 
23. Eastland, supra n. 17, at 33 ("Those whom affirmative action was intended to 
benefit came to include not only blacks, the original focus of Executive Order 10,925, 
but also, in most cases, Hispanics, Asian-Pacific Americans, and Native Americans."). 
24. Tanya T. Murphy, An Argument for Diversity Based Affirmative Action in 
Higher Education, 95 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 515, 516 (1995). 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, created to 
reinforce the Thirteenth Amendment's promise of freedom and equality to the 
emancipated slave, has become the primary weapon in the effort to end 
affirmative action policies in employment and education. Similarly, Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which once provided an incentive to promote 
equal educational opportunities, is now used as a tool to force public and 
private universities to limit the reach of their affirmative action policies. 
ld. at 516-17 (footnotes omitted). 
25. Washington Post/Kaiser/Harvard Racial Attitudes Survey at 
http://washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-srv/nationlsidebars/polls/race07110l.htm (Results are from a telephone survey of a 
nationally representative sample of I ,709 adults-including an oversarnple of minority groups-
conducted by The Washington Post, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University 
March 8-April22. The total sample included 779 whites, 323 African Americans, 315 Hispanics and 
254 Asians, and the margin of sampling error for each group is plus or minus four, six, seven and 
nine percentage points respectively. Sampling error is only one of many potential sources of error in 
this or any other public opinion poll. Fieldwork was conducted by ICR of Media, Pa.). 
26. See Richard Morin, Misperceptions Cloud Whites' View of Blacks, Wash. Post 
AOl (July 11, 2001) (comparing the survey results against the 2000 U.S. Census 
Bureau's Current Population Survey, which found that although 49 percent of all 
whites believe that blacks and whites have similar levels of education, actually about 
one in six blacks-17 percent-have completed college, compared with 28 percent of all 
whites. And 88 percent of all whites are high school graduates, compared with 79 
percent of all blacks 25 years old or older.). Not surprisingly, 49 percent of all whites 
compared to 77 percent of all blacks favored employers and colleges making an extra 
effort to find and recruit qualified minorities. Survey, supra n. 25, at question 51. It is 
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account for the resistance to racially influenced policies. In 
1978, the U.S. Supreme Court showed that this resistance to 
affirmative action was not limited to the laity. 
A The Seminal Higher Education Race-based Case: Bakke 
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held the University of California at Davis's (UC 
Davis) quota-based admissions program unconstitutionaV7 
Allan Bakke, a white male, was rejected twice for admission to 
the university's medical college.28 UC Davis rejected Bakke 
despite the fact that he received better objective scores than a 
number of minority students who were admitted under a two-
track special admissions program.29 Mr. Bakke's resulting 
lawsuit confronted the Court with the issue of whether the 
school's special admission program violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 The trial 
court found that the admissions procedure was a racial quota 
and consequently violated the federal Constitution.31 The court, 
suggested that perhaps the pervasiveness of incorrect views seems to explain, in part, 
white resistance to even the least intrusive types of affirmative action. 
27. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276. 
28. The University of California at Davis Medical School opened in 1968 with 50 
freshmen seats, and expanded enrollment to 100 seats in 1971. Id. at 272. With no 
special admissions program for minority or disadvantaged students, the first class 
contained three Asian-Americans, but no other minorities. The faculty created a 
program over the next two years to aid "disadvantaged" applicants. A separate 
admissions committee with a majority of members from minority groups was formed 
and pre-screened applicants before sending them on to the general admissions 
committee. See id. at 272-75. The special committee continued to send approved 
applicants to the general committee until 16 of the 100 seats had been filled (8 when 
there were only 50 seats). See id. at 275. Although a substantial number of the special 
committee applicants were white, only minorities were admitted through the program. 
See id. at 275-76, n. 5. 
29. See id. at 276-77. Allan Bakke applied late in 1973 with a composite score 
too low (468 on a 500-point scale) to qualifY him for admission under the regular 
program. See id. at 276. Although there were still four special admissions seats open, 
he was not considered for them. Bakke complained to the chairman of the admissions 
committee that the progran1 was a racial or ethnic quota system. See id. Bakke 
reapplied in 1974, and although he was interviewed by and received a low score from 
the chairman to whom he had previously complained, he received a score of 549 on a 
scale of 600. See id. at 277. He was again rejected, although, as was the case the prior 
year, his scores were significantly higher than those of some special admittees. See id. 
30. Bakke also claimed violations of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the California Constitution and under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. !d. at 
278. 
31. ld. at 279. 
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however, did not order Bakke's admission because he had not 
shown that he would have been admitted but for the quota.32 
Upon cross-appeal, the Supreme Court of California took the 
case directly from the trial court. 33 It agreed with the trial 
court that the admissions program was a racial quota system, 
and consequently, applied strict scrutiny. Although it found 
compelling state interests for the program, the California 
Supreme Court found the program not to be the least intrusive 
way to achieve those goals. 34 It based its decision on the Equal 
Protection clause ofthe U.S. Constitution.35 
UC Davis appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. This appeal 
marked the one and only time the U.S. Supreme Court has 
considered the constitutionality of affirmative action programs 
in university admissions. Justice Powell, writing for a divided 
Court, stated that UC Davis's admissions policy created a 
distinction drawn on racial or ethnic lines and, therefore, must 
be subjected to "the most rigid scrutiny"36 and "the most 
exacting judicial examination."37 The Court found that, of the 
four justifications the UC Davis Medical School offered for its 
race-based policy, only the goal of attaining a diverse student 
body was compelling.38 After finding the diversity interest to be 
compelling, the Court turned its attention to the question of 
whether the medical school's race-based admissions program 
was necessary to achieve the goal of attaining a diverse student 
body. Justice Powell stated: 
32. 438 U.S. at 279. 
33. See 553 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Cal. 1976). 
34. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 279; see also 553 P.2d at 1162-66. 
35. Bakke, 553 P.2d at 1166. 
36. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (citing Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)). 
37. Id. However, Powell stated, "that is not to say that all such restrictions are 
unconstitutional." !d. It is interesting to note that the Court split into two groups with 
sharply different opinions in this case. The Stevens Group, comprised of Justice 
Stevens, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, concluded that the 
special admissions program violated Bakke's rights under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. Thus, on a statutory basis alone, the Steven Group would have admitted 
Bakke to the medical school. !d. at 417-18. The Brennan Group, comprised of Justices 
Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, found the school's special admissions 
program constitutional. !d. at 362. This Group applied the intermediate scrutiny 
standard of review. The Brennan Group found that the medical school's purpose of 
remedying the effects of past societal discrimination was "sufficiently important' to 
support the use of its special admissions program 'where there is a sound basis for 
concluding that minority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic." Id. at 362. 
38. See id. at 306-311. 
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This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an 
institution of higher education. Academic freedom, 
though not a specifically enumerated constitutional 
right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the 
First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make 
its own judgments as to education includes the selection 
of its student body.39 
Nevertheless, the Court held that the university's program 
failed to withstand strict scrutiny because race was the sole 
criterion the University used to search for a diverse student 
body.40 Justice Powell, while clearly an advocate of 
institutional autonomy, indicated that race may be a "plus" 
factor in admissions decisions41 and noted two university 
admissions programs, which were using race as a factor. 42 The 
Court specifically cited Harvard's admissions program, in 
which "race has been a factor in some admissions decisions,'>43 
and to Princeton University's admission program, in which 
"race can be helpful information in enabling the admission 
officer to understand more fully what a particular candidate 
has accomplished and against what odds."44 Thus, according to 
Justice Powell, an admissions program that uses race as a 
"plus" factor will withstand strict scrutiny.45 
Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
asserted that the "central meaning" of Bakke was that 
"government may take race into account when it acts not to 
demean or insult any racial group [and] to remedy 
disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice, at 
least when appropriate findings have been made by judicial, 
legislative or administrative bodies with competence to act in 
39. ld. Justice Powell found support for this proposition in Sweatt u. Painter, 339 
U.S. 629, 634 (1950). See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313-14. 
40. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314-15. 
41. Race can be a factor in determining a particular candidate's "potential 
contribution to diversity without the factor of race being decisive" when compared to 
the qualities exhibited by others. A list of factors could include, in addition to race, 
such qualities as "exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, 
leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming 
disadvantage, [or] ability to work with the poor." Id. at 317. 
42. I d. at 316-17. 
43. ld. at 316 (citing Amici Curiae Br. for Colum. U., Harv. U., Stan. U., and the 
U. ofPa., at 2-3). 
44. Id. at 317, n. 51 (citing Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race, 
Princeton Alumni Weekly 7, 9 (Sept. 26, 1977)). 
45. Id. at 316-17. 
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this area."46 Although Justice Brennan relied on intermediate 
scrutiny, he focused on the importance of remedying the effects 
of past societal discrimination.47 
Justice Blackmun argued that, wholly apart from racial and 
ethnic considerations, any university's selection process 
inevitably results in the denial of admission to many qualified 
persons.48 Justice Blackmun found it ironic that people were so 
deeply disturbed over a program where race was an element of 
consciousness, yet no one said anything about higher education 
institutions routinely giving preference to those with athletic 
skills, to those of a certain geography, to those children of 
alumni, to the affluent, or "to those having connections with 
the celebrities, the famous and the powerful."49 Whichever 
preferences are selected, Justice Blackmun agreed that 
admissions programs were within the special competence of 
academicians, administrators, and the specialists they employ, 
rather than the judiciary. 
Justices Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice 
Stewart, and Justice Rehnquist, viewed "the question of 
whether race can ever be used as a factor in an admissions 
decision" as an issue not before the Court. 50 They found the 
majority's decision superfluous.51 
B. Affirmative Action Cases Following Bakke 
In the cases following Bakke, the courts struggled for the 
proper test to apply to affirmative action programs in the 
employment context. These cases are confusing primarily 
because of the absence of a bright line rule in Bakke, 
subsequent narrow majorities, changing substantive analysis 
and the flip-flopping level of scrutiny applied. 52 In Fullilove v. 
46. ld. at 327. 
47. Id. at 362. It is important that Justice Brennan focused on societal 
discrimination rather than discrimination particular to the state actor seeking to 
impose a race-based remedial measure. 
48. Id. at 404. 
49. Id. at 405. 
50. Id. at 408 & 411. 
51. See id. at 411. 
52. See U.S. v. Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1337 (5th Cir. 1980) ("We frankly admit 
that we are not entirely sure what to make of the various Bakke opinions. In over one 
hundred and fifty pages of United States Reports, the Justices have told us mainly that 
they have agreed to disagree."); See also U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) 
(plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) ("Although this Court has consistently held that some 
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Klutznick,53 the U.S. Supreme Court examined a 
congressionally created affirmative action program that, unlike 
Bakke, did not involve a quota, but instead mandated that a 
certain percentage of government business be awarded to 
minorities under the auspices of the Minority Business 
Enterprise Program. 54 Although Chief Justice Burger did not 
specifically set forth the applicable standard of review, he held 
that the program at issue would pass strict scrutiny.55 Chief 
Justice Burger expressly rejected the contention that Congress 
must act in a color-blind fashion. 56 "When effectuating a 
limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of a 
prior discrimination, such a 'sharing of the burden' by innocent 
parties is not impermissible."57 
In United States v. Paradise,58 the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of a temporary one-black-
for-one-white promotion scheme for Alabama state troopers.59 
An Alabama district court had ordered the color-conscious 
promotion scheme after finding that the Alabama Department 
of Public Safety had engaged in blatant racial discrimination 
for nearly four decades. Moreover, the district court found 
Alabama had willingly resisted court-ordered desegregation for 
elevated level of scrutiny is required when a racial or ethnic distinction is made for 
remedial purposes, it has yet to reach consensus on the appropriate constitutional 
analysis"); See also Kromnick v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 739 F.2d 894, 901 (3d Cir. 1984) 
("The absence of an Opinion of the Court in either Bakke or Fullilove and the 
concomitant failure of the Court to articulate an analytic framework supporting the 
judgments makes the position of the lower federal courts considering the 
constitutionality of affirmative action programs somewhat vulnerable"), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 1107 (1985). 
53. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
54. The Fullilove fact pattern was similar to that which the court would face 
fifteen years later in Adarand v. Pena. See id. at 473. The Public Works Employment 
Act of 1977 required that 10 percent of federal grants for local works projects be used to 
buy goods or services from "minority business enterprises" (MBEs). The statute 
defined an MBE as a business owned at least 50 percent (51 percent in the case of 
publicly owned businesses) by people who are "Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, 
Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts." Id. at 454 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 6705(F)(2) (Suppl. II 
1976)). Congress adopted the plan because although there were qualified minority 
businesses available to do the projects, they accounted for an "inordinately small 
percentage of government contracting. I d. at 463. 
55. I d. at 492. 
56. Id. at 482. 
57. Id. at 484. 
58. U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
59. See id. at 153. 
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more than ten years. 60 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
scheme survived strict scrutiny because the plan was narrowly 
tailored and served a compelling governmental interest.61 The 
Court specifically noted that remedying past and present 
discrimination by a state actor is unquestionably a compelling 
governmental interest.62 Justice O'Connor, however, argued 
that "rigid quotas" could not be considered narrowly tailored 
because no evidence existed that such quotas were necessary to 
erase the effects of the department's racial discrimination.63 
Justice O'Connor believed there were more benign alternatives 
available.64 
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 65 the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a school board violated the Equal 
Protection Clause when it extended preferential protection 
against layoffs to some teachers because of their race. 66 Just as 
in Bakke, the Court was splintered. Four Justices applied 
strict scrutiny and held that, even if the school board's asserted 
interest to correct prior discrimination was compelling, its 
protection scheme was not narrowly tailored to that purpose's 
fulfillment. Justice O'Connor's oft-quoted concurrence stated 
that "although its precise contours are uncertain, a state 
interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been found 
sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of higher 
education, to support the use of racial considerations in 
furthering that interest."67 
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson,68 the United States 
Supreme Court held that the City of Richmond's Minority 
Business Utilization Plan (the Plan) was unconstitutional.69 
The City of Richmond had designed the Plan in 1983 to 
increase business among Minority Business Enterprises 
(MBE).70 Richmond, with an African-American population of 
60. See Paradise u. Prescott. 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (M.D. Ala. 1983). 
61. See id. at 166-67. 
62. See id. 
63. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 187 (even 37 years apparently could not justifY a 
temporary "quota."). 
64. See id. at 198-99. 
65. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
66. !d. at 284. 
67. !d. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Powell's Bakke opinion). 
68. 488 u.s. 469 (1989). 
69. See id. at 511. 
70. See id. at 4 78. 
222 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2003 
fifty percent, had awarded less than one percent of its contracts 
to minorities between 1978 and 1983 and had virtually no 
minority members in its contractors' associations.71 The Court 
found that the Plan was not narrowly tailored to remedy the 
effects of past discrimination, 72 and that the city had failed to 
demonstrate a compelling governmental interest. 73The Court 
also stated that Richmond had failed to attempt race-neutral 
alternatives before enacting the Plan.74 
Justice O'Connor, writing the opinion for the Court in City 
of Richmond, stated that the Plan failed the narrow-tailoring 
test because it was unrealistic to assume that minorities would 
choose the construction trade in proportion to their numbers in 
the population. The relevant numbers of African-Americans 
were, according to Justice O'Connor, not the fifty percent of 
African-American population of the City of Richmond, but 
rather the pool of qualified Minority Business Enterprise 
contractors.75 Justice O'Connor concluded that, "in sum, none of 
the evidence presented by the city points to any identified 
discrimination in the Richmond construction industry."76 
Justice O'Connor stated that the City was wrong in relying on 
general findings of discrimination in the entire construction 
industry. 
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
disagreed with Justice O'Connor's position that racial 
classifications were only permissible to remedy past wrongs. 77 
However, he did agree that the Plan benefited persons who 
were not victims of discrimination, and that the Plan imposed a 
stigma on its beneficiaries.78 
Justice Scalia, who concurred only in the judgment, would 
have held that state and local governments may never 
discriminate on the basis of race to remedy the effects of past 
discrimination. 79 Justice Scalia concluded: 
Racial preferences appear to "even the score" (in some 
71. See id. at 479-80. 
72. See id. at 507-08. 
73. See id. at 505. 
74. See id. at 507. 
75. Id. at 501-02. 
76. Id. at 505. 
77. See id. at 511. 
78. See id. at 515-16. 
79. See id. at 520. 
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small degree) only if one embraces the proposition that 
our society is appropriately viewed as divided into races, 
making it right that an injustice rendered in the past to 
a black man should be compensated for by 
discriminating against a white. Nothing is worth that 
embrace.80 
223 
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,81 a five-Justice majority 
held that "benign" race-based classifications enacted by 
Congress are to be subjected to intermediate scrutiny. 82 The 
Court stated that racial classifications would withstand 
intermediate scrutiny if they did not "impose undue burdens on 
nonminorities."83 Two FCC policies were at issue in Metro 
Broadcasting.84 These policies favored minority-owned 
businesses, applying for radio and television broadcast 
licenses.85 In upholding the policies, Justice Brennan, who 
wrote the majority, took pains to detail the lack of minority 
ownership of radio and television stations.86 He underscored 
the point that the FCC had only adopted race-conscious 
methods after other methods had been tried and failed. 87 He 
announced: 
We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated 
by Congress-even if those measures are not "remedial" 
in the sense of being designed to compensate victims of 
past governmental or societal discrimination-are 
constitutionally permissible to the extent that they 
serve important governmental objectives within the 
power of Congress and are substantially related to 
achievement ofthose objectives.88 
Justice Brennan held that Congress's interest in enhancing 
broadcast diversity was "at the very least, an important 
80. ld. at 528. 
81. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
82. See id. at 596-97. Note: This was Justice Brennan's last opinion before 
retiring. He was replaced with David Souter who assisted in overruling Metro 
Broadcasting in Adarand v. Pena. 
83. !d. 
84. See id. at 552. 
85. Minorities were defined by the FCC as "Black, Hispanic, Surnamed, American 
Eskimo, Aleut, American Indian and Asiatic American extraction." ld. at 553 n. 1. 
86. Although in 1986 minorities made up at least 20% of the population, they 
owned only two. One percent of the 11,000 radio and television stations in the U.S. See 
id. at 553. 
87. See id. at 554-56. 
88. !d. at 564-65 (footnotes omitted). 
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governmental objective" in the context of radio and television 
0 89 programmmg. 
1. The Application of Bakke's Strict Scrutiny for Race-based 
Classifications 
InAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,90 the Court overruled 
its decision in Metro Broadcasting91 to apply intermediate 
scrutiny and held that race-based classifications are 
constitutional only if they are "narrowly tailored measures that 
further compelling governmental interests."92 In other words, 
the Court's holding in Adarand resolved all existing 
ambiguities by making strict scrutiny the standard of review 
for race-based programs. Hence, strict scrutiny applies to race-
based programs regardless of whether the programs are state 
or federal, or whether they benefit the racial majority or the 
racial minority. 93 
In Adarand, Adarand Constructors, Inc. sued the federal 
government when congressionally created preferences resulted 
in the award of a guardrail subcontract to the minority-owned 
Gonzales Construction Company. 94 Gonzales was awarded the 
project despite the fact that Adarand had submitted the lowest 
bid for the project. 95 Adarand sought declaratory and 
89. Id. at 566-67. 
90. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
91. See id. at 225. 
92. See id. at 227. 
93. Id. 
94. See id. at 205. 
95. See id. The prime contractor, Mountain Gravel & Construction Company, 
received additional compensation if it hired subcontractors certified as small 
businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." Id. 
Gonzales was certified; Adarand was not. Mountain Gravel would not have chosen 
Gonzales but for the additional compensation. See id. Under the relevant statutory 
provision, social and economic disadvantage could be manifest in a person of any race, 
but the contractor was allowed to presume such disadvantage in the case of African-
American, Hispanic American, Native American, Asian Pacific Americans and other 
minorities. See id. (citing section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 637 (d)(2)(3) 
(1994). The Act defines "socially disadvantaged individuals" as those individuals who 
are subject to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias, and defines "economically 
disadvantaged individuals" as those individuals who are socially disadvantaged 
individuals with a diminished ability to compete in the free enterprise system. See id. 
at 206 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 637 (a)(5), (a)(6)(A)). The compensation was one of a number 
of provisions designed to provide such individuals with not less than 5 percent of 
subcontracts. See id. at 206. However, non-minorities could prove disadvantaged 
status on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence," and the presumption of 
disadvantage enjoyed by minorities could be rebutted by third persons. See id. at 207-
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injunctive relief against use of race-based presumptions.96 It 
argued that the government's use of race-based presumptions 
in their project award process violated the Equal Protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.97 
The district court granted the government's motion for 
summary judgment,98 and the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.99 The Tenth Circuit read 
Fullilove as having adopted "a lenient standard, resembling 
intermediate scrutiny in assessing" federal race-based 
measures, and held that Metro Broadcasting had refined this 
lenient standard.100 
Because the case was brought under the Fifth Amendment, 
the Court then re-examined the differing levels of scrutiny it 
had applied under the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. 
The Court ultimately found that the level of scrutiny it had 
applied under the two, different Amendments was essentially 
the same. 101 Thus, strict scrutiny should apply to race-based 
actions whether taken by a state government or the federal 
government. 
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, looked at 
whether race-based governmental actions should be subjected 
to strict scrutiny when benefiting historically disadvantaged 
groups. While she concluded that federal and state programs 
to benefit "disadvantaged businesses" were not 
unconstitutional, she intimated that it may be difficult for 
those programs to pass strict scrutiny.102 Past and present 
discrimination against the minority group in question must be 
proven, rather than assumed, and the proponent must show 
that its program benefits only the victims of past 
discrimination.103 The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the 
appellate court's judgment in Adarand and remanded the case 
to the district court. 104 It instructed the district court to 
08. 
96. 
97. 
98. 
99. 
100. 
101. 
102. 
103. 
104. 
See id. at 210. 
Id. at 204. 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1992). 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (lOth Cir. 1994). 
515 U.S. at 210 (citing 16 F.3d at 1544-47). 
See id. at 217. 
I d. at 228 (quoting Stevens, J., dissenting at 246). 
See id. at 228-29. 
See id. at 239. 
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determine whether the government's use of subcontractor 
compensation clauses could survive strict scrutiny. 105 
Justice Scalia concurred in the majority's judgment but 
declined to join in Part III-C of Justice O'Connor's opinion. He 
believed that racial preferences can never survive strict 
scrutiny.106 A "government can never have a 'compelling 
interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make 
up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction."107 
Justice Ginsburg did not agree with Justice Scalia.108 For 
Justice Ginsburg, the irony of Justice Scalia's claim that "we 
are just one race" was apparent in the fact that the present 
effects of past discrimination exist today because our 
lawmakers and judges have not been color-blind for 
generations.109 Justice Thomas, like Justice Scalia, also 
concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately to emphasize 
his belief that there is not a "racial paternalism exception to 
the principle of equal protection."110 Thus, Justice Thomas 
would not favor distinctions based upon race. 
Adarand went back to the district court, as per the U.S. 
Supreme Court's command, to evaluate the federal contracting 
procurement of the Subcontractor Compensation Clause, which 
continued to use race-conscious presumptions. The district 
court granted Adarand's motion for summary judgment, 
finding the government's program unconstitutional. 111 The 
government, meanwhile, changed the way in which it 
implemented the race-conscious program in highway 
construction matters. 112 Quotas were not permitted, and to 
ensure that contractors benefiting from the program were truly 
disadvantaged, the recipients needed to demonstrate that their 
net worth was less than $750,000. On appeal, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's holdings 
and held that the Subcontractor Compensation Clause 
Program and the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise 
105. See id. at 238. 
106. See id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring). For Justice Scalia, strict scrutiny would 
indeed be fatal in fact. 
107. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
108. See id. at 271 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
109. See id. at 272 (quoting 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
110. !d. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgement). 
111. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Colo. 1997). 
112. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 228 F.3d 1147, 1155 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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Certification Program were permissible and constitutional.113 
2. The Fourth Circuit and Race-based Admissions Policies 
In Podberesky v. Kirwan, 114 the Fourth Circuit was faced 
with the issue of whether the University of Maryland at 
College Park's Banneker scholarship program for Mrican-
Americans could survive strict scrutiny.115 Unlike the 
aforementioned cases, the plaintiff in this case was Hispanic, 
not white. The university argued, and the district court 
agreed, that the scholarship program was aimed at the present 
effects of past discrimination. The district court found that the 
program was narrowly tailored to remedy those present 
effects. 116 The university was able to demonstrate that there 
was a basis for the perception by African-Americans that a 
hostile climate existed at the university. 117 The University of 
Maryland relied on statistical data, namely the 
underrepresentation of African-Americans in the student 
population and their low retention and graduation rates, to 
demonstrate the present effects. ns The university argued that 
the purpose of the Banneker scholarship was to increase the 
number of qualified African-American Maryland residents 
attending the University.119 Further, the university posited 
that Banneker scholars would act as role models, thereby 
attracting more African-American students to the school.120 
The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed the district court's 
summary judgment in favor of the university. 121 The court of 
appeals took issue with the district court's finding that the 
university suffered present effects of past racial discrimination. 
The court of appeals attributed the current problems at the 
113. Id. 
114. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995). 
115. See id. at 151. The Banneker scholarship program was a merit-based 
program open only to African-Americans. 
116. See id. (citing 838 F. Supp. at 1075, 1094 CD. Md. 1993)). 
117. See id. at 154. 
118. See id. at 155. 
119. See id. at 159. 
120. See id. It is not clear why awarding a scholarship to an African-American 
from any state besides Maryland is any less capable of remedying the effects of past 
University discrimination than awarding the same scholarship to a Maryland-born 
African-American but the court seemed focused on this. 
121. See id. at 161. 
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university to societal discrimination. 122 The fact societal 
discrimination existed precluded the inference of a nexus 
between past university discrimination and the hostility felt by 
current students. 123 The court of appeals was similarly 
unimpressed by the university's statistical information, 
revealing low Mrican-American populations, and found that 
the possibility of other causes, such as "economic ... factors," 
existed. 124 
Even if the university had been able to demonstrate 
sufficient present effects of past discrimination, the court of 
appeals suggested that the program still would have failed the 
"narrowly tailored" prong of the strict scrutiny test. 125 The 
university's averred purpose was to increase the number of 
qualified African-American Maryland residents attending the 
university. However, the court of appeals found the fact that 
the scholarships were not exclusively for Maryland residents to 
be "indicative of lack of narrow tailoring."126 Finally, the court 
of appeals found the fact that the University had not attempted 
any race-neutral alternative measures to be determinative. 127 
3. The Fifth Circuit and Raced-based Admissions Policies 
Cheryl Hopwood, Douglas Carvell, Kenneth Elliott, and 
David Roger were white, Texas residents, who applied for 
admission to the University of Texas Law School in 1992.128 All 
four were rejected, and they brought suit against the law 
school, claiming violations of their rights under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 129 The crux of 
their complaint was that the law school's affirmative action 
admissions program subjected them to unconstitutional racial 
122. See id. at 155. Although the district court found that student surveys and 
focus groups revealed hostility through class segregation, social situations and dining 
rooms, treatment by fraternities and sororities, and patronizing behavior by faculty. 
Id. at 154, n. 2. 
123. Societal discrimination was found by the fact that several Northern 
universities suffered from similar racial problems. See id. at 154. 
124. See id. at 155-56. 
125. See id. at 160-61. 
126. See id. at 159. 
127. Id. at 161. 
128. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert denied 518 U.S. 1033 
(1996) ("Hopwood IF'). 
129. Id. at 938. The plaintiffs also claimed statutory violations under Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
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discrimination. 
The admission procedure employed by the law school in 
1992 was based on the availability of 500 seats. Initially, each 
application was assigned to one of the three administrative 
categories, which were based solely on the applicant's Texas 
Index (TI) score: 1) presumptive admit, 2) discretionary zone, 
and 3) presumptive deny. 130 The TI scores required for 
placement in the various categories were lower for minority 
applicants than for non-minority applicants.131 In 1992, the 
cutoff scores were adjusted several times to increase the 
number of presumptive admits. By March 1992, the 
"presumptive admit" threshold for non-minority applicants was 
at a TI score of 199, and the denial ceiling for those applicants 
was at 192. For minority applicants, the presumptive admit 
threshold was 192, and the presumptive denial ceiling was 
179.132 Once an application had been placed in one of the three 
administrative categories, different procedures were used for 
determining whether admission would be offered. 133 
The district court analyzed the law school's admissions 
program under a strict scrutiny standard of review. 134 Of the 
five reasons the law school offered for maintaining its 
admissions program, the district court held that two of the 
reasons qualified as compelling government interests: 
!)"obtaining the [educational] benefits that flow from a racially 
and ethnically diverse student body" and 2) "overcoming the 
past effects of discrimination."135 In considering the scope of 
past discrimination, the district court rejected the applicants' 
argument that past discrimination be limited to the law 
school's history. Instead, the district court held that Texas 
"institutions of higher education are inextricably linked to the 
130. ld. 
131. Id. The term "minority" as used in the Law School's admissions procedure 
refers only to African Americans and Mexican Americans. Id. at 265, n. 29. 
132. I d. (citing Hopwood B, 999 F. Supp. at 880) (citation omitted). 
133. ld. 
134. Hopwood u. Texas (Hopwood 1), 861 F. Supp. 551, 569 (W.D. Tex. 1994), reu'd, 
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), reh'g en bane denied, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996) cert. 
denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). 
135. Id. at 570. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that under 
recent Supreme Court decisions, the only compelling government interest for race-
based programs was remedying the past effects of racial discrimination. "However, 
none of the recent opinions is factually based in the education context and, therefore, 
none focuses on the unique role of education in our society." I d. 
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primary and secondary schools in the system,"136 and as a 
result, Texas' history of racial discrimination in public schools 
contributed to the law school's reputation among minorities as 
both a "white school" and a hostile environment.137 
The district court upheld that part of the admissions 
program that gave minorities a "plus" by treating their IT 
scores differently based upon race. 138 However, the district 
court struck down the part of the admissions program that 
used separate admissions committees, which never compared 
candidates of different races. 139 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit also applied the strict scrutiny 
standard of review. The court of appeals, in contrast to the 
district court, found that neither attaining a diverse student 
body nor remedying the effects of past discrimination were 
sufficiently compelling governmental interests to justify the 
law school's race-based admissions program.140 Writing for the 
court of appeals, Judge Smith supported his holding on three 
different bases. First, Judge Smith wrote that Justice Powell's 
diversity rationale in Bakke "[was] not binding precedent on 
this issue."141 Second, "no case since Bakke has accepted 
diversity as a compelling state interest under a strict scrutiny 
analysis." 142 Previous U.S. Supreme Court decisions indicate 
that the only compelling state interest to justify racial 
136. Id. at 571. The court noted that even if past discrimination were limited to 
the University of Texas alone, there would still be a strong basis for concluding that 
remedial action was warranted. Id. at 572. 
137. Id. There was no evidence of'overt officially sanctioned discrimination" at the 
University of Texas. The school had expended considerable effort in recruiting 
minorities and minimizing racial discrimination. However, the court found that the 
school's "legacy of the past' still persisted into the present. Id. The University of Texas 
continued to implement discriminatory policies against both black and Mexican 
American students during the 1950s and 1960s. Id. at 555. Between 1978 and 1980, 
the Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Office for Civil Rights (OCR) investigated 
Texas' public higher education system and found that it was not in compliance with 
Title VI and still maintained vestiges of de jure segregation. I d. at 556. "To date, OCR 
has not completed its evaluation to determine if Texas is in compliance with Title VI." 
Id. at 557. 
138. Id. at 578. 
139. Id. at 578-79. 
140. Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 962. 
141. Id. at 944. Judge Smith wrote that the word "diversity" was mentioned only 
once in Justice Powell's single-Justice opinion, and that when he "announced the 
judgment, no other Justice joined in that part of the opinion discussing the diversity 
rationale." Id. 
142. Id. 
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classifications is remedying the effects of past discrimination. 
Third, Judge Smith opposed the use of race as a means of 
achieving student body diversity on policy grounds. 143 He wrote 
that the use of race in higher education admissions "contradicts 
rather than furthers, the aims of equal protection."144 It 
"simply achieves a student body that looks different. Such a 
criterion is no more rational on its own terms than would be 
choices based upon the physical size or blood type of 
applicants."145 Judge Smith stressed that a school could 
reasonably consider many other factors outside of race in 
making its admissions decisions, including those "which may 
have some correlation with race."146 
A university may properly favor one applicant over 
another because of his ability to play the cello, make a 
downfield tackle, or understand chaos theory. An 
admissions process may also consider an applicant's 
home state or relationship to school alumni. Law 
schools specifically may look at things such as unusual 
or substantial extracurricular activities in college, 
which may be atypical factors affecting undergraduate 
grades. Schools may even consider factors such as 
whether an applicant's parents attended college or the 
applicant's economic and social background.147 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals next turned its attention 
to an evaluation of the purported compelling, government 
interest of remedying the effects of past discrimination. Noting 
that a state actor "must ensure .. .it has convincing evidence 
that remedial action is warranted,"148 the court of appeals 
concluded that the law school, not the entire State of Texas' 
educational system, was the appropriate governmental unit for 
measuring a constitutional remedy. 149 Each of the three present 
effects of past discrimination: hostile environment for 
minorities, school's poor reputation among minorities, and 
143. !d. 
144. Id. at 945. 
145. ld. Judge Smith wrote further: "Diversity fosters, rather than minimizes, the 
use of race. It treats minorities as a group, rather than as individuals. It may further 
remedial purposes but, just as likely, may promote improper racial stereotypes, thus 
fueling racial hostility." ld. 
146. Id. at 946. 
147. Id. 
148. ld. at 950. 
149. Id. 
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underrepresentation of minorities was rejected by the court. 150 
The Fifth Circuit held that the law school had not shown a 
compelling state interest in remedial discrimination sufficient 
to justify its use of a race-based admissions program. 151 
Judge Wiener of the Fifth Circuit wrote a concurring 
opinion in Hopwood. 152 Although he agreed with the result, he 
disagreed that "diversity can never be a compelling 
governmental interest in a public graduate school."153 Judge 
Wiener would have held the admissions program 
unconstitutional on grounds that it was not narrowly tailored; 
the program limited the label "minorities" to only African 
Americans and Mexican Americans. 154 Judge Wiener was also 
very uncomfortable with the majority's outright rejection of 
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. He wrote: "If Bakke is to be 
declared dead, the Supreme Court, not a three-panel circuit 
court, should make that announcement."155 Subsequently, a 
suggestion for rehearing en bane was denied when a majority of 
the Fifth Circuit's sixteen regular active judges declined to 
rehear the issue.156 Seven judges dissented from the rehearing 
denial with sharp criticism, writing that the "far-reaching 
importance" of the decision "demanded the attention of more 
than a divided panel."157 
A petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court 
was also denied. 158 Although Justices Ginsburg and Souter 
acknowledged that the constitutional issue of race or ethnicity-
150. The court relied on Podberesky u. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 153 (4th Cir. 1994), 
that the poor reputation was due to "historical fact" which was not the kind of present 
effect that could justifY current racial classifications. Hopwood II, 78 F.3d 952-53. In 
addition, the court wrote that "one cannot conclude that the law school's past 
discrimination has created any current hostile environment for minorities." Id. at 953. 
Rather, any racial tensions were the result of present societal discrimination. Finally, 
the court rejected the underrepresentation of minorities as a present effect of past 
discrimination. Id. There was no showing of "overt officially sanctioned 
discrimination." !d. at 954 (quoting Hopwood I, 861 F. Supp. at 572). 
151. Id. at 955. Because there was no showing of a compelling state interest, the 
Fifth Circuit did not have to consider whether the admissions program was narrowly 
tailored to achieve the state interest. 
152. !d. at 962 (Wiener, J., specially concurring). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 963. 
156. Hopwood u. Texas (Hopwood II[), 84 F.3d 720, 720, cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 
(1996). 
157. Id. at 722. 
158. 518 u.s. 1033. 
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based admissions programs in higher education "is an issue of 
great importance," the law school's objectionable admissions 
program had already been discontinued for some time, making 
the issue moot. 159 
On remand for other issues, the district court found, 160 and 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed, none of the plaintiffs in Hopwood 
would have been offered admission in 1992 even under a race-
blind system. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's 
injunction, thereby refusing to permit consideration of race in 
the law school's admission process. The United States 
Supreme Court refused to review the Fifth Circuit's holding.161 
There is little doubt that the Hopwood decision has re-
ignited the debate over preferential admissions policies. 
Because the U.S. Supreme Court chose not to review the case, 
one cannot state with certainty that Judge Smith's underlying 
reasoning is correct. However, two factors do seem to weaken 
his analysis. First, the negative sentiment generated by his 
decision likely limits Hopwood's legal impact. In fact, at least 
one Texas law school dean has openly defied Hopwood's 
conclusions.162 Second, Hopwood, since it was decided by the 
Fifth Circuit, is only binding precedent on the courts of Texas, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi. Louisiana and Mississippi have 
continued to use racial preferences after Hopwood because of 
federal court orders to desegregate their higher education 
systems. 163 
4. The Ninth Circuit and Race-based Admissions Policies 
In Smith v. University of Washington Law School/64 
Katuria Smith, Angela Rock, and Michael Pyle brought suit on 
159. ld. 
160. Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (Hopwood B). 
161. Hopwood v. Texas, 533 U.S. 929 (2001). 
162. See Barbara Bader Aldave, Hopwood v. Texas: Much Ado About Nothing? 
Tex. L. 43 (Nov. 11, 1996) (writing as dean of St. Mary's University School of Law in 
San Antonio: "I can promise you this: Unless and until my superiors order me to stop, 
we at St. Mary's University School of Law are going to ignore the Hopwood decision 
and adhere to the guidelines of Bakke. I am immensely proud that 41 percent of the 
students in our first year class are members of minority groups, and that our school 
now has a higher percentage of Mexican-American students than any other law school 
in the United States."). 
163. See Cathy Young, The High Price of Racial Preferences, Boston Globe A15 
(June 27, 2001). 
164. 2 F. Supp.2d 1324 (W.D. Wash. 1998). 
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behalf of themselves and a class of Caucasians, claiming they 
had been denied admission to the University of Washington 
Law School because of racially discriminatory admissions 
policies. 165 From 1994 to December of 1998, the law school used 
race as a criterion in its admissions process to assure the 
enrollment of a diverse student body. 166 The school's 
admissions policy stated: 
Important academic objectives are furthered by classes 
comprised of students having talents and skills derived 
from diverse backgrounds believed to be relevant to a 
rich and effective study of law. Factors that indicate 
this diversity include, but are not limited to, racial or 
ethnic ongm, cultural background, activities or 
accomplishments, career goals, living experiences ... , or 
special talents. The list is not exhaustive, and the 
factors are not of equal weight; moreover, no single 
factor is dispositive. 167 
Moreover, the policy stated "affirmative action will be taken to 
increase substantially the number of minority group 
members ... in educational programs where they have been 
traditionally underrepresented."168 
Applicants to the law school were admitted based on their 
undergraduate grades, LSAT scores, and a "personal 
statement," in which they were invited to describe how their 
life experiences would contribute to the diversity of the law 
school. 169 A three-step process of review was conducted to 
apportion approximately one hundred sixty-five seats. 170 Both 
minority and non-minority applications were reviewed in 
concert and ranked on a scale from three to fifteen. Offers 
were made based on an applicant's index score. 171 The plaintiff-
applicants offered statistics they contended raised questions 
165. Id. at 1328. Katuria Smith applied for and was denied admission in 1994, Ms. 
Rock in 1995, and Mr. Pyle in 1996. 
166. Id. The Law school's admission policy provided that its objective was to 
"select individuals who have the highest potential for achievement and 
contribution .... The Law school has determined this objective is best obtained by ... 
individuals who have demonstrated the greatest capacity for high quality work ... and 
who will contribute to the diversity of the student body." Id. 
167. Id. at 1329. 
168. Id. at 1330. 
169. Id. at 1329. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
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about the role of race in the University of Washington's 
admissions policies. The plaintiffs noted that in 1994, for 
example, nearly seventy-nine percent of those admitted with 
index scores below 193 were racial minorities. 172 In 1994, one 
hundred percent of African-American applicants with GPAs 
between 2.5 and 3.24, and with LSAT scores in the 155-159 
range, were admitted while none of the 131 candidates 
identified as "white or other ethnicity" with comparative grades 
and LSAT scores were admitted. 173 
While Smith was pending, the voters of the State of 
Washington passed Initiative Measure 200, which enacted the 
following provision: "[T]he state shall not discriminate against, 
or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on 
the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the 
operation of public employment, public education, or public 
contracting."174 Upon the passage of Measure 200, the law 
school eliminated the use of race as a criterion in its admission 
process. The new admissions policy, however, did retain a 
diversity clause, which stated that "important academic 
objectives are furthered by. . . students. . . from diverse 
backgrounds."175 Nevertheless, race, color, and national origin 
were excluded from the list of diversity factors. 176 In the final 
analysis, the district court granted the law school's motion to 
dismiss, declaring the individual and class claims moot due to 
the passage of Initiative Measure 200. 177 However, the district 
court did hold that race could be used as a factor in achieving 
educational diversity even where it is not done for remedial 
purposes. 178 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed, inter alia, two key 
issues: 1) whether educational diversity is a compelling 
governmental interest under strict scrutiny under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and 2) whether race may be 
172. Id. at 1330. 
173. Id. 
174. Wash. Rev. Code§ 49.601.400(1). 
175. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1192. The non-exhaustive list of factors indicative of 
diversity include: persevering or personal adversity or other social hardships; having 
lived in a foreign country or spoken a language other than English at home; career 
goals; employment history; educational background; evidence of and potential for 
leadership; geographic diversity or unique life experiences; and special talents. I d. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 1196. 
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considered in the admissions process only for remedial 
purposes.179 The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court 
and held: 1) that educational diversity is a compelling 
governmental interest that meets the demands for strict 
scrutiny, and 2) that the Fourteenth Amendment permits 
university admissions programs to consider race for reasons 
other than remedial purposes. The court examined the 
fractured ruling of Bakke to determine whether Justice 
Powell's concurring opinion was truly the controlling opinion. 
The court decided that it was. 
We are well aware of the fact that much has happened 
since Bakke was handed down. Since that time, the 
court has not looked upon race-based factors with much 
favor. Still, it has not returned to the area of university 
admissions, and has not indicated that Justice Powell's 
approach has lost its vitality in that unique niche in our 
. t 180 SOCle y. 
On May 29, 2001, the United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari. 181 Although the state of Washington's Initiative 
Measure 200 prohibited the consideration of race in public 
education, Smith became binding precedent for the states of 
Nevada, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Oregon. California, 
which is also located within the Ninth Circuit, passed 
Proposition 209, a referendum, prohibiting the consideration of 
. bl' d t' 182 race 1n pu 1c e uca 10n. 
5. The Eleventh Circuit and Race-based Admissions Policies 
Two seminal cases, involving race-conscious admissions 
programs, took place within the Eleventh Circuit. Wooden v. 
Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia concerned 
the University of Georgia's (UGA) admissions policy from 1995 
to 1997. Its admissions program during this period was based 
on a three-stage process. 183 In the initial stage, the Academic 
Index or AI stage, UGA objectively judged applications without 
regard to the applicant's race. In 1997, to be admitted to the 
179. Id. at 1192. 
180. Id. at 1200 (cites omitted). 
181. Smith v. U. of Wash. L. Sch., cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 2192 (2001). 
182. Cal. Const. art. I § 31 (1996). 
183. Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the U. Sys. of Ga., 24 7 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 
2001). 
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university during the AI stage, an applicant to UGA was 
required to have an AI score of 2.50 or above. Applicants with 
an AI below 2.25 were rejected outright.184 Those students 
whose academic indices were above a certain number and met 
the minimum SAT scores were put into a "further evaluation" 
group. 185 In other words, their applications continued on in the 
process. Green, the only surviving plaintiff, was among that 
group of applicants, with an AI of 2.39 and an SAT equivalency 
score of 1170-1190.186 
Much of the district and appellate court opinions in Wooden 
were devoted to standing. The courts focused on whether 
Green suffered an "injury in fact."187 UGA alleged that, because 
Green's race was not a factor in the ultimate decision to deny 
his application, he lacked standing to challenge UGA's 
admission policy. Even if Green had received the 0.5 point 
credit for his "non-white" ethnic status, UGA proffered that his 
application still would have been tossed out in the final, ER 
stage. In other words, although UGA may have affirmatively 
considered his race at some point in the admissions process, 
the unrebutted evidence showed that its final decision to reject 
his application was not based on race. 
In opposition, Green argued that he had standing because 
UGA's admissions process inflicted a constitutional injury upon 
him. Just having his application threaded through a process 
that considered race was enough, he argued. Citing 
Jacksonville, 188 Green contended "a plaintiff who challenges an 
ongoing race-conscious program and seeks forward-looking 
184. ld. at 1266. 
185. ld. 
186. Id. For each applicant placed in this group, the university calculated a Total 
Student Index (TSI). The TSI is based on a combination of weighted academic and 
demographic factors. It is only at this stage that the university expressly considered 
an applicant's race, although other factors such as Georgia residence, alumni 
relationships, extracurricular activities and after-school hours were considered as well. 
In calculating a TSI score for applicants to the 1997 freshman class, UGA awarded 0.5 
points under the category "Demographic Factors" to applicants who self-classified 
themselves as non-Caucasians. Applicants, such as Green, who did not do this, did not 
receive the point credit. Green received a TSI score of 3.89, which included credits for 
his parents' educational level, his Georgia residency, his relatively high GPNSAT score 
and his male gender. Had he designed himself as white, his TSI score of 4.39 would 
have been 0.5 points higher than it was, but still lower than the 4.40 threshold for 
automatic admission. I d. 
187. Id. at 1270. 
188. N.E. Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 
U.S. 656, 666 (1993). 
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relief need not affirmatively establish that he would receive the 
benefit in question if race were not considered. The relevant 
injury in such cases is 'the inability to compete on an equal 
fi t · m189 oo mg. 
The appellate court ruled that, for standing purposes, the 
issue was whether Green's application had actually been 
treated differently at some stage in the admissions process 
because of his race. 190 If his application was treated differently, 
then Green had not competed on an equal footing with other 
applicants, and consequently he suffered an injury-in-fact. 
Conversely, if Green's application was never actually treated 
differently because of his race, then Green had no standing. 191 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's summary 
judgment of no standing and remanded the case to the district 
court for further proceedings. 
In a different case, Johnson v. University of Georgia, 192 the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia held 
that the promotion of student body diversity in higher 
education was not a compelling interest sufficient to meet the 
test of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 193 This case concerned the 1999 
admissions process for the University of Georgia. 
The University of Georgia subjected its 1999 applicants to a 
three-stage evaluation process except that, in contrast to the 
1997 process, that required an AI score of 2.50 or above for 
automatically admittance in the first stage, 1999 applicants 
needed a minimum AI score of 2.86 to be automatically 
admitted. 194 TSI scores were again used to re-rank applicants 
who were not automatically admitted or rejected in the second 
stage. Persons of color still received the 0.5 point credit toward 
their TSI score, and males received an additional 0.25 TSI 
points simply because of their gender. Hence, a non-white 
male could receive an additional 0. 75 TSI points. 195 To be 
automatically admitted in 1999 during the TSI stage, 
applicants needed a TSI score over 4.92; in contrast, applicants 
189. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1269. 
190. See id. at 1278. 
191. Id. 
192. Johnson v. U. of Ga., 106 F. Supp.2d 1362 (S.D. Ga. 2000). 
193. ld. at 1375. 
194. ld. at 1365. 
195. ld. 
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needed a TSI score of 4.40 in 1997. Those 1999 applicants 
having a TSI score between a 4.66-4.92 were referred to the 
ER or final stage.196 
Plaintiff Jennifer Johnson, a white female, received a TSI 
score of 4.10. Since she did not receive the additional 0.75 TSI 
points, which were allocated for non-white males, her TSI was 
below the 4.66 second-stage cutoff. Consequently, she was 
denied admission without the ER-phase review. 197 Had she 
received the additional 0. 75 TSI points, she would have 
qualified for the ER stage. Ms. Johnson was, however, 
eventually admitted to UGA three days after bringing this 
action, but by that time, she had already been accepted to and 
planned on attending another University.198 
The two remaining plaintiffs in Johnson, Aimee Bogrow 
and Molly Ann Beckenhauer received second-stage TSI scores 
of 4.52 and 4.06, respectively. 199 Just as with Ms. Johnson, 
neither Ms. Bogrow nor Ms. Beckenhaur was awarded the 0.75 
race/gender point credits. Had UGA awarded those points, Ms. 
Bogrow would have been admitted, and Ms. Beckenhauer 
would have qualified for ER consideration.200 However, without 
the bonus points, both persons were denied admission. 
The district court determined strict scrutiny to be the 
applicable standard of review. The court then addressed the 
issue of whether using racial preferences to promote "diversity" 
was a compelling governmental interest that would survive 
strict scrutiny.201 The University of Georgia claimed the TSI 
phase of its admission plan was patterned on the Harvard Plan 
that Justice Powell spoke of, and approved of, in Bakke. The 
district court, however, found Justice Powell's view of 
Harvard's admissions system to be "mere dicta."202 In addition, 
since Justice Powell's "statements ... gained the support of no 
other J ustice,"203 his opinion should not be considered by courts 
b. d' d t 204 as m mg prece en . 
196. I d. 
197. I d. 
198. ld. at 1366. 
199. I d. 
200. I d. 
201. I d. 
202. Id. at 1369. 
203. I d. 
204. I d. 
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UGA's difficulty stemmed from its inability "to 
meaningfully show how [racial diversity] actually foster[ed] 
educational benefits."205 Former UGA President Charles Knapp 
argued that educational diversity was a compelling interest 
because, after graduation, students will need to work 
cooperatively with people from "different ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds," and this skill "cannot be fully acquired by 
students whose educational and life experiences have been 
racially or culturally homogenous."206 Judge Edenfield of the 
district court found such generalized assertions to be merely 
speculative. In addition, the district court noted that 
affirmative action programs were usually approved only for 
limited durations, and UGA was ill-prepared "to identify with 
particularity exactly when or how that goal. .. [would] be 
met."207 Likening the case to Croson, the district court held that 
UGA's system used race as a proxy for a purported interest: 
that minorities, through their presence, make a valued 
contribution to the other students' education.208 This interest 
was insufficient to meet strict scrutiny according to the district 
court. 
6. The Sixth Circuit and Race-based Admissions Policies 
In Gratz v. Board of Regents of the University of Michigan, 
209 plaintiffs Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher, both white, 
Michigan residents, applied for admission into the University 
of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) 
in 1995 and 1997, respectively.210 Both persons were denied 
admission and subsequently filed a motion for summary 
judgment, asserting that LSA's use of race as a factor in 
admissions decisions violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and the Equal Protection Clause of 
the United States Constitution.211 
Two compelling interests were asserted by LSA and its 
205. ld at 1371 (citing Tracy v. Bd. of Regents, 59 F. Supp.2d 1314, 1322 (S.D.Ga. 
1999)). 
206. !d. at 1372. 
207. !d. at 1372. 
208. !d. at 1374. 
209. Gratz v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of Mich., 122 F. Supp.2d 811 (E. D. Mich. 
2000). 
210. Id. at 815. 
211. ld. at 813. 
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minority intervenors. First, LSA had a compelling interest in 
the educational benefits that result from having a diverse 
student body. Second, LSA had a compelling interest in 
remedying the University of Michigan's past and current 
discriminatory practices against minorities.212 
Recognizing that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke came 
from a sharply divided court, the district court in Gratz labeled 
the desire by the University of Michigan for a diverse student 
body a compelling interest.213 "It is clear that a majority of the 
Justices in Bakke expressly agreed that the California Supreme 
Court erred in enjoining the university from ever considering 
race in its admission programs."214Dismissing the Fifth's Circuit 
Hopwood decision, Judge Patrick Duggan of the Sixth Circuit 
opined that the Fifth Circuit erred in reading Justice 
Brennan's silence in Bakke as rejection. 215 In fact, his silence 
could have just as easily been interpreted as "implicit 
approval."216 Upon examination of past U.S. Supreme Court 
cases, involving the diversity rationale and strict scrutiny, the 
Gratz court found that those cases did not apply because they 
did not involve the context of higher education.217 
Interestingly, the University of Michigan presented 
overwhelming expert testimony and solid evidence, regarding 
the educational benefits that flowed from a racially and 
ethnically diverse student body.218 One study, presented by 
Professor Patricia Y. Gurin,219 cited research suggesting that 
"[s]tudents learn better in a diverse educational environment, 
and they are better prepared to become active participants in 
[a] pluralistic, democratic society once they leave such a 
212. ld. at 816. 
213. !d. at 819. 
214. !d. 
215. ld. at 820. 
216. !d. 
217. Id. at 821. 
218. !d. at 822-23. 
219. Professor of Psychology at the University of Michigan and Interim Dean of the 
LSA. Professor Gurin used her thirty-four years of experience in social psychological 
research and teaching to analyze data from a Michigan Student Study and nine years' 
worth of data from a national sample of institutions and students from the Cooperative 
Institutional Research Program in her report. See Patricia Gurin, The Compelling 
Need for Diversity in Higher Education, at 
http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/epertlsumm.html (accessed July 20, 
2001). 
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setting."220 In addition, Professor Gurin cited to multi-
institutional national data, extensive surveys, and data drawn 
from specific classroom programs at the University of Michigan 
to show that "students who experienced the most racial and 
ethnic diversity in classroom settings and in informal 
interactions with peers showed the greatest engagement in 
active thinking processes, growth in intellectual engagement 
and motivation, and growth in intellectual and academic 
skills."221 These students, she averred, were also "better able to 
understand and consider multiple perspectives, deal with 
conflicts that different perspectives sometimes create, and 
appreciate the common values and integrative forces that 
harness differences in pursuit of common ground."222 A number 
of amici-filed briefs in Gratz concurred with the University of 
Michigan and Professor Gurin's position; diversity results in a 
richer educational experience for students. 223 
To this evidence, the plaintiff-applicants presented no 
argument or evidence to rebut the University and Professor 
Gurin's assertions. Rather, the plaintiffs' main argument was 
that diversity was an important goal, but did not rise to the 
level of a compelling, state interest. The district court found 
the goal of achieving a diverse student body a compelling 
interest.224 
The district court then examined whether LSA's admission 
program was narrowly tailored. The court held it was.225 LSA's 
admission counselors took race into account in two 
determinative and important ways: each underrepresented 
minority applicant could be assigned twenty points on account 
of race at the outset in calculating his or her index score, and/or 
admissions counselors could "flag" an applicant as possessing 
certain qualities or characteristics, including physical qualities, 
220. Gratz, 122 F. Supp.2d at 822 (citing Gurin Report, supra n. 219, at 3). 
221. Id. (citing Gurin Report, supra n. 219, at 5). 
222. Id. 
223. Along with the ALS and ACE, the following filed amicus briefs in support of 
the University's position: the United States, the State of Ohio, the Michigan Attorney 
General, General Motors corporation, Steelcase, Inc., joined by nineteen other global 
corporations, and the National Association of Social Workers, joined by the Council on 
Social Work Education, the Association of Baccalaureate Social Work Program 
Directors, Inc., and the Group for the Advancement of Doctoral Education in Social 
Work. Id. at n. 13. 
224. Id. at 824. 
225. !d. at 828. 
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which LSA deemed important to the composition of the 
incoming class. 226 The court held such uses of race operated as 
nothing more than "plus" factors, which Justice Powell 
enunciated, and approved of, in Bakke.227 
Moreover, minority applicants were not insulated from 
review by virtue of these additional twenty points any more 
than other applicants were insulated from review by virtue of 
other points given. In fact, the Court noted that in certain 
circumstances, these other, possible points might combine for a 
total of up to forty. 228 The fact that these points might "tip the 
balance" in favor of a particular applicant, however, did not 
mean that such applicants had been insulated from 
t "t" 229 compe 1 Ion. 
Further, the district court held the University of Michigan's 
program was not a "dual' or "two-tracked" system prohibited by 
Bakke. 230 The program at issue in Bakke had one group of 
students, i.e., minority students, competing for one set of seats, 
and another group of students, i.e., majority students, 
competing for another set of seats. This process, in effect, 
created two, separate admissions programs. Nothing in Bakke, 
however, prohibited the practice of employing different GPA 
requirements for minorities vis-a-vis majority students.231 
Further, LSA's system did not utilize a separate admissions 
review committee for underrepresented minority applications 
as did the review committee in Bakke.232 
Finally, the district court in Gratz found LSA's efforts to 
enlarge its pool of underrepresented minority applicants 
through vigorous minority recruitment programs, which had 
all proved to be unsuccessful, determinative.233 Recruiting 
fairs, direct mailings, campus visits, and personal contact with 
minorities continually resulted in a low pool of minority 
applicants. 
226. !d. at 827. 
227. !d. at 828. 
228. !d. Points were given as follows: Six points for geographic factors, four points 
for alumni relationships, three points for outstanding essay, five points for leadership 
and service skills, twenty points for socioeconomic status or twenty points for athletes. 
!d. 
229. !d. 
230. Id. at 828. 
231. !d. 
232. !d. 
233. !d. at 831. 
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In another Sixth Circuit case, Grutter v. Bollinger,234 
Barbara Grutter applied for admission to the University of 
Michigan Law School in 1996.235 At first, she was placed on the 
waiting list, but in June of 1997, she was denied admission. 
Ms. Grutter brought suit, alleging that she was rejected 
because the law school used race as the "predominant" factor in 
its admission process, giving minority applicants a 
"significantly greater chance of admission than students with 
similar credentials from disfavored groups."236 She claimed 
racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 237 
Since 1992, the University of Michigan Law School's 
admissions policy had openly acknowledged a commitment to 
racial and ethnic diversity.238 Both in its written admissions 
policy and its law school bulletin, the law school stressed its 
effort to increase the numbers of students from racial and 
ethnic groups. "By enrolling a 'critical mass' of minority 
students, we have ensured their ability to make unique 
contributions to the character of the Law School."239 
Under Michigan's system, law school applicants were 
selected from one of three groups. The first group consisted of 
applicants who were chosen based on the "numbers."240 The 
second group consisted of a pool of applicants who had lower 
"numbers" but other interesting qualities. The third group, 
known as the "special admission" group, was for minority 
candidates who did not fall within the other two groups. 
234. Grutter u. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp.2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
235. !d. at 824. 
236. !d. (quoting Plaintiffs Complaint). 
237. !d. She also claimed defendants violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Ms. Grutter sought declaratory judgment that her rights were 
violated; an injunction prohibiting racial discrimination in admissions; compensatory 
and punitive damages; an order requiring the defendants to admit her to the law 
school; and attorney fees and costs. !d. at 824. 
238. Id. at 827. The admissions policy explains that applicants with lower index 
scores may be admitted because they "may help achieve that diversity which has the 
potential to enrich everyone's education and thus make a law school class stronger 
than the sum of its parts." Id. (quoting the UMLS Admissions Policy at 3). This is 
referred to as "diversity admissions". Additional factors to be considered include: an 
applicant's interesting or unusual employment experiences, extracurricular activities, 
travel experiences, athletic accomplishments, volunteer work, or foreign language 
fluency. 
239. !d. at 828 (quoting the Admissions Policy at 12). 
240. !d. at 830. 
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Approximately one-half of the minority applicants, who were 
ultimately admitted, came from the first two groups; the other 
half came from the third or special group. 241 The "special 
admissions" program was adopted to increase the minority 
population at the law school.242 At trial, Michigan's law school 
Director of Admissions from 1979 to 1990 testified that "the 
law school had a 'goal' or 'target' whereby ten to twelve percent 
of the students of each entering class should be Black, Chicano, 
Native American, and mainland Puerto Rican."243 Admission 
was handled on a "rolling basis," and "daily reports" were used 
to keep track of the number of applications received to date, the 
number of applicants offered admission, the number rejected, 
the number on the waiting list, and so on. 244 As the admissions 
season progressed, the Director of Admissions admitted he 
consulted the "daily reports" more often in order to ensure that 
a "critical mass" of minority students was enrolled.245 
At trial, no one seemed to be able to quantify what was 
meant by "critical mass," but one administrator testified that, 
during his tenure from 1979-1990, at least eleven to seventeen 
percent of each class consisted of African American, Hispanic, 
and Native American students.246 One admissions director 
defined it as "meaningful numbers," "meaningful 
representation," or "a number sufficient so that the minority 
students can contribute to classroom dialog and not feel 
isolated."247 However, university witnesses were adamant that 
the university did not have a set number, percentage, or 
"quota" for this "critical mass" achievement. 
While the law school posited that race was only one element 
in the admissions decision-making process, the trial court 
seemed persuaded by statisticians who testified that 
Michigan's law school placed a very heavy emphasis on an 
241. ld. 
242. !d. 
243. ld. at 831. In fact, testimony revealed that over the years, the law school 
faculty agreed that black and Hispanic students should constitute between 10 percent 
and 12.5 percent of the entering class. 
244. !d. at 832. 
245. !d. 
246. ld. 
24 7. !d. at 832-33. Defining "critical mass" was important to the court in 
determining whether a targeted number had been preset. Testimony revealed that the 
consideration of race was crucial. Had admissions decisions been driven by the 
numbers, only ten minority students per entering class would have been admitted .. 
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applicant's race in deciding whether to accept or reject the 
applicant. "When cell by cell, and year by year, 
underrepresented minority applicants are admitted in 
significantly greater proportions than their non-minority 
competitors with similar UGPA and LSAT scores, it is clear 
that the law school accords the race of the applicants a great 
deal ofweight."248 
The trial court then addressed the issues of whether the 
achievement of racial diversity was a compelling state interest 
and, if so, whether the law school's admissions policy was 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.249 In reviewing Bakke, 
the court noted that Justice Powell was the only Justice to 
mention diversity. "The Brennan group did not so much as 
mention diversity rationale in their opinion, and they 
specifically declined to join in the portion of Justice Powell's 
opinion that addressed that issue."250 The law school argued 
that Justice Powell's opinion was controlling because it was the 
narrowest ground that supported the judgment.251 The trial 
court held that Bakke did not stand for the proposition that a 
state educational institution's desire to assemble a racially 
diverse student body is a compelling governmental interest.252 
Further, the court held that under post-Bakke U.S. Supreme 
Court cases, the achievement of such diversity was not a 
compelling state interest because it was not a remedy for past 
discrimination. 253 
The court did not hold that racial diversity was 
unimportant, but it did draw a distinction between viewpoint 
diversity and racial diversity. 254 Although the experts that 
testified in Grutter had also testified during the Gratz case, the 
court, nevertheless, refused to find a compelling interest in 
diversity. 
Even if the university had convinced the court that 
diversity was a compelling interest, the admissions program 
was deemed to have failed the "narrow tailoring" test for 
several reasons. First, no witness could define what "critical 
248. Id. at 842. 
249. I d. at 843. 
250. ld. at 846. 
251. Id. at 847. 
252. ld at 848. 
253. ld. at 849. 
254. I d. 
211] BACK TO BAKKE 247 
mass" meant in terms of percentages or numbers. 255 "Narrow 
tailoring is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve when the 
contours of the interest being served are so ill-defined."256 
Second, there was no time limit on the law school's use of race 
in the admissions process, and, by using race to ensure the 
enrollment of a certain minimum percentage; the law school 
had practically set up a quota system. "There is no principled 
difference between a fixed number of seats and an essentially 
fixed minimum percentage figure."257 Third, under Michigan's 
system, students did not compete against one another for each 
seat. There was no logical basis for the law school to have 
chosen the particular racial groups that received special 
attention under the current admissions policy. 258 Fourth, the 
law school failed to utilize alternative means for increasing 
. "t ll t 259 m1non y enro men . 
The Grutter trial court ordered an injunction, enjoining the 
law school from considering race as a factor in its admission 
process.260 On May 14, 2002, in a 5-4 decision the Sixth Circuit 
reversed the District Court's judgment in Grutter,261 holding 
that the law school's interest in achieving a diverse student 
body was a compelling interest, surviving strict scrutiny 
pursuant to Bakke. 262 The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the 
district court's refusal to apply the Marks analysis to Bakke 
"because Justice Powell's rationale was not 'subsumed' in that 
of the Brennan concurrence."263 In fact, the Sixth Circuit found 
Justice Powell's opinion to be the narrowest, a decision in line 
with the Marks analysis. "[T]he Brennan concurrence agreed 
with Justice Powell that Davis's admissions program was 
255. Id. at 850. 
256. ld. 
257. ld. 
258. Id. The 1992 admissions policy, at page 12 identifies "African Americans, 
Hispanics and Native Americans". Later, the law school bulletin indicated that special 
attention has been given to "students who are African American, Mexican American, 
Native American, or mainland Puerto Rican." I d. 
259. Id. at 853. The court lists race-neutral alternatives such as: increasing 
recruiting efforts, using a lottery system for all qualified applicants, decreasing the 
emphasis for all applicants on undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores, or a system 
whereby a certain number or percentage of the top graduates from various colleges and 
universities are admitted. Id. 
260. I d. at 872. 
261. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F. 3d 732 (6th Cir 2002). 
262. See id. at 739. 
263. Id. at 740. 
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subject to heightened scrutiny .... [It] disagreed only with his 
application of strict scrutiny .... As Justice Powell's rationale 
would permit the most limited consideration of race ... it is at 
the most Bakke's narrowest rationale."264 
The Sixth Circuit also disagreed with the district court's 
contention that Justice Powell was the only Justice to mention 
diversity. The Sixth Circuit opined that Justice Brennan's first 
footnote gave qualified approval of a race-conscious admissions 
policy: "We also agree with Mr. Justice POWELL that a plan 
like the 'Harvard' plan ... is constitutional under our approach, 
at least so long as the use of race to achieve an integrated 
student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of past 
discrimination."265 Further, the language "at least so long as" 
does not mean "only if."266 The court of appeals argued that this 
qualifying language only "modifies when race may be used ... it 
does not modify why.267 Thus, a university need not show that 
it is remedying specific instances of past discrimination in 
order to use race as a factor in admissions. The Sixth Circuit 
quoted Justice Brennan's opinion in Metro Broadcasting, lnc.,268 
citing Bakke "for the proposition that a 'diverse student body' 
contributing to a 'robust exchange of ideas' is a 'constitutionally 
permissible goal' on which race-conscious university 
admissions programs may be predicated."269 
The Sixth Circuit spent considerable time favorably 
comparing Michigan's law school admissions policy to the 
Harvard plan approved of in Bakke. Just as in the Harvard 
plan, Michigan used race and ethnicity, along with a number of 
other factors, as a potential "plus."270 Moreover, like the 
Harvard plan, no student was insulated from competing with 
other prospective students at Michigan.271 "That the Law 
264. Id. at 741. 
265. ld. at 742 (emphasis in original) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326 n.l (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added)). 
266. ld. 
267. ld. at 742-43. 
268. 497 U.S. 547, 568 (1990), overruled on other grounds Adarand, 525 U.S. at 
227. 
269. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 743. 
270. ld. at 746-47. "In seeking an academically diverse class, the record indicates 
that the Law School considers more than an applicant's race and ethnicity." Id. "In 
light of the foregoing, we find that the Law School's consideration of race and ethnicity 
is virtually indistinguishable from the Harvard plan Justice Powell approved in Bakke. 
Id. at 747. 
271. See id. 
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School's pursuit of a 'critical mass' has resulted in an 
approximate range of underrepresented minority enrollment 
does not transform 'critical mass' into a quota."272 
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the remaining factors the 
district court had used to declare that the law school's 
admissions program as not narrowly tailored. 273 "First, the 
district court's conclusion that the term 'critical mass' is not 
sufficiently defined is at odds with the extensive record in this 
case, and the district court's own characterization of 'critical 
mass' as the functional equivalent of a quota." 274 Second, as to 
"the district court's statement that 'there is no logical basis for 
the law school to have chosen the particular groups which 
receive special attention under the admissions policy,"275 the 
Sixth Circuit stated that "some degree of deference must be 
accorded to the educational judgment of the Law School in its 
determination of which groups to target."276 As to the district 
court's assertion that the law school had not availed itself of 
alternate means to increase minority enrollment, the Sixth 
Circuit contended that the evidence suggested otherwise. "We 
note that we do not read Bakke and the Supreme Court's 
subsequent decisions to require the Law School to choose 
between meaningful racial and ethnic diversity and academic 
selectivity. "277 
Finally, the Sixth Circuit examined the district court's 
determination that the law school's policy must fail because 
there was no definite stopping point. The court of appeals 
agreed that a race-conscious remedial program should have a 
self-contained stopping point.278 However, as the court 
succinctly pointed out, "this directive does not neatly transfer 
to an institution of higher education's non-remedial 
consideration of race and ethnicity."279 The United States 
Supreme Court has granted Barbara Grutter's petition for writ 
272. Id. at 748. 
273. ld. at 749. "As a initial matter, we have serious reservations regarding the 
district court's consideration of five factors not found in Bakke." ld. 
274. ld. at 751. 
275. ld. (quoting Grutter, 137 F.Supp.2d at 850). 
276. ld. (quoting Regents of the U. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985)). 
277. Id. at 750. 
278. ld. at 751. 
279. !d. at 752. The dissent and concurring opinions, while critical of the majority 
opinion, are unique in that they seem to be written in an effort to complain about the 
procedures used to hear this case en bane. See id. at 752-773. 
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of certiorari.280 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF REMOVING RACE-BASED ADMISSIONS 
POLICIES 
A. California and Proposition 209 
On November 5, 1996, fifty-four percent of Californians 
voted to adopt Proposition 209, otherwise known as the 
"California Civil Rights Initiative."281 Proposition 209 prohibits 
discrimination and racial and gender preferences in public 
employment, public education, and public contracting.282 One 
day after Proposition 209 was passed, the constitutionality of 
the Initiative was challenged in Coalition for Economic Equity 
u. Wilson. 283 The plaintiffs in Wilson asserted that Proposition 
209 interfered with their equal protection rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore, sought a preliminary 
injunction, enjoining state officials from implementing the 
Initiative.284 
The district court began by noting that much of the 
language contained in Proposition 209 "simply affirm[ed] 
existing anti-discrimination protections already provided by 
the United States and California Constitutions and by the 1964 
Civil Rights Act."285 However, the district court did find that 
Proposition 209 had a racial focus and restructured the 
political process "to the detriment of the interests of minorities 
and women."286 Consequently, the district court granted the 
preliminary injunction.287 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held 
that Proposition 209 did not violate the United States 
Constitution and vacated the injunction.288 
280. Grutter v. Bollinger, 2002 U.S. Lexis 8677 (Dec. 2, 2002). 
281. Cal. Const. art. I § 31. 
282. Cal. Const. art. I § 31, cl. A ("The state shall not discriminate against, or 
grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or 
public contracting."). 
283. 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (Wilson I). 
284. ld. at 1488, 1491. 
285. ld. 
286. ld. at 1506. 
287. ld. at 1520. 
288. Wilson II, 122 F. 3d 692, 710 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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What are the effects of Proposition 209? In 1996, 89 
Hispanics, 43 African Americans, and 10 Native Americans 
were enrolled as first year students at the top three public 
California law schools.289 In 1997, the year Proposition 209 
took effect, these numbers fell to 59, 16, and 4, respectively.290 
Enrollment of minorities in California's law school had declined 
by eighty-one percent. At University of California, Berkeley, 
only one African American enrolled in the freshman law class 
in 1997, whereas twenty had been enrolled in the freshman 
class the year before.291 Between 1994 and 1996, thirteen 
Filipinos were enrolled at Boalt.292 After Proposition 209, 
Boalt's 1997 class included zero Filipinos, as did its 1999 
entering class.293 After a similar initiative passed in the State 
of Washington in 1998, the number of applications, 
acceptances, and enrollments of minority students at the 
University of Washington dropped by comparable measures for 
the 1999 freshman class.294 Even using college-transfer 
policies, in part, as a way around the ban on racial preferences 
in admissions, the numbers still dropped. 295 
B. Texas and the Aftermath of Hopwood 
The Hopwood decision, which banned the consideration of 
applicants' race in university admissions in the Fifth Circuit, 
also affected enrollment of underrepresented minority 
students. At the University of Texas School of Law at Austin, 
whose admissions system was challenged in Hopwood, the 
percentage of the entering class that was African American 
dropped from five-point-eight (twenty-nine students) in 1996 to 
point-nine percent (four students) in 1997.296The percentage of 
Native Americans enrolled at that law school dropped from 
one-point-two percent (six students) in 1996 to point-two 
289. Grutter, 137 F. Supp.2d at 858. 
290. ld. 
291. Id. See also Larry Reibstein, What Color is an A?, Newsweek 77 (Dec. 29, 
1997). 
292. See Boalt Hall School of Law, 1999 Annual Admission Report 11 (1999). 
293. See id. 
294. See Roberto Sancho, UW Minority Enrollment to Fall-Officials Plan to 
Improve Recruitment, Outreach, Seattle Times A12 (May 18, 1999). 
295. See, Sara Hebel, States Without Affirmative Action Focus on Community-
College Transfers, Chron. of Higher Educ. A35 (May 26, 2000). 
296. Grutter, 137 F. Supp.2d at 858. 
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percent (1 student) in 1997. 297 Enrollment for Hispanics 
dropped from nine-point-two percent (forty-six students) in 
1996 to six-point-seven percent (thirty-one students) in 1997.298 
In an attempt to alleviate the effects of the Hopwood 
decision, the Texas legislature adopted a policy, guaranteeing 
all students who finish in the top ten percent of their high 
school class admission to any state university.299 This type of 
program has also been initiated in Florida under the Florida 
One Initiative, whereby the top twenty percent are guaranteed 
admission to the state universities.300 
On March 19, 1999, the University of California Board of 
Regents adopted a similar policy of admission, guaranteeing 
admission to all California applicants who ranked in the top 
four percent of their high school class. The plan was devised by 
Governor Davis as a means of booting minority numbers in the 
UC system.301 
The Texas and California programs have been criticized for 
two main reasons. First, critics argue such an approach has 
the effect of "admitting some students from weaker high 
schools while turning down better-prepared applicants who 
happen not to finish in the top tenth of their class in 
academically stronger schools."302 "College admissions officers 
have long known that class rank is hardly comparable from one 
high school to the next. The top students in many high poverty 
schools are woefully unprepared for college."303 Second, since 
the very success of producing a diverse student body depends 
on the continuing de facto segregation of high schools, the 
297. Id. 
298. Id. 
299. See Robert M. Berdahl, Essay, Policies of Opportunity: Fairness and 
Affirmative Action in the Twenty-First Century, 51 Case W. Res. 115, 123 (2000). 
300. ld. Governor Jeb Bush celebrated an almost 12 percent increase in the 
proportion of minorities attending public universities for fall 2000, the first year of 
Florida's controversial plan to end affirmative action in college admissions. However, 
the actual proportion of minorities in the freshman class of 2000-2001 remained 
relatively unchanged from 1999-2000. Opponents argued that the enrollment surge 
had more to do with population growth than with his policy to end racial preferences. 
See Gary Finout, Florida Governor Touts Minority Enrollment Increase after Racial 
Preferences Ban, Black Issues in Higher Educ. 17 (Sept. 28, 2000). 
301. Kenneth R. Weiss, UC Regents OK Plan to Admit Top 4%, L.A. Times A18 
Mar. 20, 1999). 
302. Gratz, 122 F.Supp.2d at 830 (quoting William Bowen). 
303. Gary Orfield & Edward Miller, Chilling Admissions 10 (Harv. Civ. Rts. 
Project & Harv. Educ. Publishing Group 1998). 
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cause of a fully integrated and racially just society is not 
advanced.304 
1. Expert Opinions on Race-based Admissions Policies 
Expert after expert testified in Gratz and Grutter, setting 
forth reasons why affirmative action programs continue to be 
needed in higher education, why they are important as a 
remedy for past and present discrimination, and the compelling 
need for diversity in higher education.305 Disproportionate 
numbers of Native Americans, Mrican Americans, and 
Hispanics live and go to school in impoverished areas of the 
country. "It should not surprise anyone that students, who 
attend school where books are lacking, where classrooms are 
overcrowded, and where advanced placement or other higher 
level courses are not offered, are at a competitive disadvantage 
as compared to students, whose schools do not suffer from such 
shortcomings."306 Advanced placement courses are not 
available in every high school. "As many as twenty-five 
percent of California's high schools offer no AP courses 
whatsoever. Yet some high schools, four percent, offered 
twenty-one or more AP courses."307 Imagine graduating from 
high school with a 4.0 grade point average only to be rejected 
for admission in favor of a student, whose straight "A" grade 
point was boosted to 5.0 due to AP courses. Indeed, our 
nation's public schools as a whole are currently under attack 
for their inability to offer a quality education to our nation's 
youth.308 The top students in general are not performing as 
304. A 1993-1994 study comparing student scores on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills 
showed that black students in mostly segregated schools failed to reach the national 
average for their age bracket, while black students in integrated schools exceeded the 
national average. See Gary Orfield, Susan Eaton & Harv. Project on Sch. 
Desegregation, Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of 
Education 130-31 (The New Press 1996). Moreover, scores for both black and white 
students rose by approximately 20 points during a period of time when busing 
promoted racial diversity in the area schools. I d. at 132. 
305. See Gratz, 122 F.Supp.2d at 822-24; see also Grutter, 137 F.Supp.2d at 849-50. 
306. Grutter, 137 F. Supp.2d at 864. 
307. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Essay: Two Views of the River: A Critique of the 
Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 928, 944 (2001); see also, 
William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term Consequences of 
Considering Race in College and University Admissions 18-19 (Princeton U. Press 
1998). 
308. See Paul E. Peterson, School Choice: A Report Card, 6 Va. J. Soc. Policy & L. 
47, 54-58 (1998), for a survey of the public school system that concludes that big city 
254 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2003 
well on standardized tests as they once did. If affirmative 
action in higher education is to be dismantled, the quality of 
primary and secondary education must first be stable. 
An extensive body of research indicates that Blacks and 
Latinos have consistently scored more poorly on standardized 
SAT and LSAT tests than white and Asian Americans. 309 Many 
studies have challenged the usefulness of standardized tests in 
predicting the performance of poor and minority students, 
finding that the SAT does a better job of predicting the socio-
economic status of the test taker's parents than predicting 
college performance.310 One explanation for this is that to some 
extent, standardized tests, like the SAT and the LSAT, are 
"heavily loaded with academic English."311 This disadvantages 
Hispanics because English is their second language. Mrican 
Americans are also disadvantaged because many-sixty 
percent- speak "Black English."312 
It is undisputed that underrepresented minority groups 
have, on average, lower undergraduate grade-point averages 
(UGPA) than whites. "Among applicants accepted by the 
University of Michigan Law School from 1995 to 2000, the 
median UGPA of every underrepresented minority group has 
been lower than the median UGPA of Caucasians by 
approximately one-tenth to three-tenths of a point. 313 One 
cannot ignore the large amounts of research that point 
conclusively to the benefits of racial diversity to all students. 
The Shape of the River,314 a book written by William Bowen and 
Derek Bok, former presidents at Princeton and Harvard, 
schools are the worst off, but that the "problems in American education are endemic." 
ld. at 47; see also Nat!. Commn. on Excellence in Educ., A Nation At Risk 5 (Dept. of 
Educ. 1983). The study warned that "the educational foundations of our society are 
presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a 
Nation and a people ... we have, in effect, been committing an act of unthinking, 
unilateral education disarmament." 
309. See Nicholas Lemann, The Great Sorting, A. Mthly. 84, 99-100 (Sept. 1995) 
(arguing that use of the SAT achieves mixed results, sometimes at the expense of 
students at the bottom of the social structure who are least prepared for the test). 
310. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: 
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 953, 957 (1996) (criticizing the 
continued reliance on standardized tests). 
311. Grutter, 137 F. Supp.2d at 862 (quoting Dr. Eugene Garcia, Dean of the 
School of Education, U.C. Berkeley). 
312. Id. 
313. Grutter, 137 F. Supp.2d at 864. 
314. Bowen, supra n. 307. 
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respectively, draws on a forty-year longitudinal study of more 
than 80,000 black and white students who attended twenty-
eight of the nation's best colleges and universities. The book 
begins with the authors' bias: they believe that the end of 
affirmative action would impoverish us all.315 Full of statistics, 
graphs, tables, and multivariate regressions, The Shape of the 
River constitutes a compelling brief for race-sensitive 
admissions in higher education. In addition, Patricia Gurin, 
Professor of Psychology at the University of Michigan, has 
shown that experience with diversity in college has impressive 
effects on the extent to which graduates in the national survey 
lived racially and ethnically integrated lives. 316 Professor 
Gurin's studies represent the first time a major university has 
amassed empirical data to show that segregated education is 
substandard education.317 "Students who experienced the most 
racial and ethnic diversity in classroom settings and informal 
interactions with peers showed the greatest engagement in 
active thinking process, growth in intellectual engagement and 
motivation, and growth in intellectual and academic skills."318 
As Justice Powell in Bakke made very clear, it is a 
university's prerogative to decide what to teach and who to 
admit, so long as individual freedoms are not trampled upon.319 
If race is used as one simple though important factor, to ensure 
the diversity and equality of access to quality or elite 
educational facilities, that should be a compelling interest to 
meet strict scrutiny. The law doesn't treat everyone equally. If 
a student is denied admission in favor of a student with lower 
SAT scores, but has an alumni mother, does it make it any 
more fair? Some applicants will get points for being athletes, 
for their age, and/or for their family background. Others will 
get points for playing chess, for being from Iowa, and/or for 
having alumni relationships. Some applicants will even get 
points for their financial contributions or celebrity status. 
Therefore, it follows that some applicants should get points for 
adding to the cultural enrichment of all. 
315. Id. 
316. See Gurin, supra, n. 219. 
317. Id. Gurin's study, relied on heavily in Gratz, utilized data collected from 
nearly 200 colleges and universities in reaching its conclusion to uphold the University 
of Michigan's race-conscious admission program. 
318. Id. 
319. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12. 
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IV. SUMMARY 
Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education,320 the U.S. 
Supreme Court has frequently recognized the uniqueness of the 
educational setting in Equal Protection cases. Specifically, the 
Court has acknowledged "those qualities which are incapable of 
objective measurement" and the importance of providing an 
educational environment conducive to "the interplay of ideas 
and the exchange of views."321 Justice Powell specifically 
recognized the importance of diversity in higher education, as 
have judges across the nation. 
The primary mission of colleges and universities is to 
educate those students who are likely to become the leaders of 
society in an increasingly diverse world. The learning 
environment of higher education is special; it encourages the 
robust exchange of ideas and of culture. More importantly, the 
extent to which a college student is exposed to diversity has 
impressive effects on the extent to which he or she later lives a 
racially and ethnically integrated life. A racially diverse 
campus is essential to the education of students. 
320. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy u. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) by 
concluding "that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has 
no place"). The Court wrote "Education is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship." I d. at 493. 
321. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634. 
